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had enunciated in Allen, 1 9 the Court of Appeals has embarked upon
a highly questionable course. The Court has indeed imposed a heavy
burden on litigants by requiring that they conduct an independent
investigation in an attempt to discover evidence already possessed by
a nonparty. This investigation very often may amount to nothing more
than an unnecessary, costly, and time-consuming duplication of a completed investigation. Moreover, depending upon the subject matter of
the investigation, a party may be put at a serious disadvantage if he
is forced to litigate his claim without the aid of evidence obtained by
a nonparty investigatory body. In a situation such as Cirale,for example,
the investigation of a public agency with superior skills and manpower
is likely to be more thorough than that of an ordinary litigant. The
stringent requirements in New York for disclosure against a nonparty
will most likely be given, therefore, serious consideration by the practitoner choosing a forum for his action.
ARTICLE

34-

CALENDAR PRACT1ICE; TRiAL PREFERENCES

CPLR 3404: Fourth Departmentvacates a dismissal for abandonment
upon condition that neglectful attorney pay $1000 in costs.
CPLR 3404 provides for the dismissal of cases which have been
struck from the calendar and not restored within one year. 140 The
purpose and principal advantage of rule 3404 is that it prevents cases
actually abandoned from "haunting litigants" years later.141 Unlike
1'3 Professor Siegel has expressed the fear that trial judges who have "accumulated
their experience under the much more restrictive approach (to disclosure) of the old Civil
Practice Act" would not implement "the Court of Appeals' aim in Allen ....
.. 7B
McKINNEY'S CPLR 8101, commentary at 27 (1970). Ironically, a number of trial judges
did apply the Allen reasoning to CPLR 8101(a)(4), see note 123 supra, while the Court of
Appeals in Cirale did not. See text accompanying notes 132-34 supra.
140 CPLR 3404 states:
A case in the supreme court or a county court marked "off" or struck from the
calendar or unanswered on a clerk's calendar call, and not restored within one
year thereafter, shall be deemed abandoned and shall be dismissed without
costs for neglect to prosecute. The clerk shall make an appropriate entry without
the necessity of an order.
The Court of Appeals, in vacating the dismissal of an action which was litigated for 25
years, construed the phrase "deemed abandoned" as suggesting "a presumption rather
than a fixed and immutable policy of dismissal... [which] was never intended to apply
to a case where litigation in a cause was actually in progress." Marco v. Sachs, 10 N.Y.2d
542, 550, 181 N.E.2d 892, 895, 226 N.Y.S.2d 853, 358 (1962) (emphasis added). In Tactuk v.
Freiberg, 24 App. Div. 2d 503, 261 N.Y.S.2d 438 (2d Dep't 1965), the Appellate Division,
Second Department, held that a CPLR 3404 dismissal was unjustified where a motion was
pending at the time of the dismissal and the parties were actively negotiating matters
related to the action, noting there had been no abandonment in fact.
CPLR 8404 is limited to the supreme court and the county courts. Other courts, however, such as the Court of Claims, the district courts, and the New York City Civil Court,
have similar rules. See 4 WK&-M
8404.10 n.19.
1414 WKM
3404.01.
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CPLR 3216 which enables a party to move for dismissal for want of
prosecution, 142 CPLR 3404 is self-operating, i.e. after the one-year
period has expired, no order is required for the case to be marked
abandoned by the clerk. The court, however, may grant a motion to
restore the case to the trial calendar after a motion to vacate the dismissal has been made. 14 3 This motion to vacate must be made within
one year of the dismissal. 14 In addition, the moving party must demonstrate the existence of a meritorious cause of action, an absence of
prejudice to the opposing party, and a satisfactory excuse for the
145
delay.
As a rule, the Fourth Department has been very strict in its
requirements for vacating a 3404 dismissal. 14 6 This includes a specific
refusal to recognize "law office failures"' 47 as excusable neglect. 148 In
this regard, the court's decision in Schickler v. Seifert 4" represents a
liberalization of the traditional attitude of the court.
The plaintiffs in Schickler, having sustained substantial injuries
142 A dismissal under CPLR 3216 is permissible only where one year has elapsed since

the joinder of issue and a written demand for the resumption of prosecution has been
served on the party against whom such relief is sought. That party may avoid dismissal of
the action by filing a note of issue within 45 days following receipt of such service. CPLR
3404.02.
3216. See also 4 WK&M

143 Before moving to restore the case to the calendar following a CPLR 8404 dismissal, a motion to vacate the dismissal must be made under CPLR 5015. 4 WK&M
3404.04. The First Department has not strictly adhered to this requirement, choosing
instead to ignore plaintiff's failure to accompany a motion to restore a case dismissed
under CPLR 3404 with a CPLR 5015 motion. See Wavrovics v. City of New York, 13 App.
Div. 2d 738, 214 N.Y.S.2d 818 (1st Dep't 1961); Radar-Electronics, Inc. v. Oscar Lenenthal,
Inc., 8 App. Div. 2d 778, 186 N.Y.S.2d 107 (Ist Dep't 1959). The Fourth Department,
however, is apparently less hesitant to deny the motion to restore where plaintiff has
made no motion to set aside the 3404 dismissal. See, e.g., Campbell v. Puntoro, 36 App.
Div. 2d 568, 317 N.Y.S.2d 768 (4th Dep't 1971).

144 CPLR 5015(a)(1).

145 See 7 CARMODY-WArr 2d § 44.6, at 284 (1966).
146 See, e.g., Mclntire Associates, Inc. v. Glens Falls

Ins. Co., 41 App. Div. 2d 692, 342
N.Y.S.2d 819 (4th Dep't 1973). There, the court refused to vacate a 3,04 dismissal because
of plaintiff's failure to accompany the application with an affidavit of merits by a "person
having knowledge of the facts indicating a viable cause of action. Further, there was no
showing of an absence of prejudice to defendant if the action were restored." Id. at
692-93, 342 N.Y.S.2d at 820. The court noted that under CPLR 5015(a)(1), a motion to
open a default pursuant to 3404 requires the same proof of merit and excusable neglect
needed to open any other default judgment.
147 The concept of "law office failure" is a very general one. It may involve errors
or omissions by counsel or counsel's assistants (including office staff and independent
contractors), counsel's personal problems or work load, or a fire destroying counsel's
records. See generally 7 CARMODY-WAIT 2d § 44.27, at 307 (1968); 4 WK&M 1 3216.07.
148 See, e.g., McIntire Associates, Inc. v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 41 App. Div. 2d 692,
342 N.Y.S.2d 819 (4th Dep't 1973); Trudel v. Laube's Amherst, Inc., 40 App. Div. 2d 625,
336 N.YS&2d 503 (4th Dep't 1972) (mem.); Alaimo v. D & F Transit, Inc., 35 App. Div. 2d
776, 316 N.Y.S.2d 690 (4th Dep't 1970) (mem.); Delmonte v. Wozniak, 29 App. Div. 2d
735, 286 N.Y.S.2d 960 (4th Dep't 1968) (mem.).
149 45 App. Div. 2d 816, 357 N.Y.S.2d 225 (4th Dep't 1974) (mem.).
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as a result of a 1969 automobile accident, initiated suits in 1970 and
1971. These suits were consolidated and placed on the general docket
on September 21, 1971; plaintiffs' attorney, however, was unwilling to
proceed at that time. In January and March of 1972 two motions by
plaintiffs' attorney to file supplemental bills of particulars were denied.
Apparently, plaintiffs' attorneys caused considerable delay by their
efforts to include in the action injuries and expenses not originally
listed in the initial bills of particulars. Subsequently, plaintiffs made
a motion to restore the case to the calendar in September of 1972.
On the return date, however, plaintiffs' counsel defaulted on his own
motion. As a result, two days later the case was marked abandoned by
the court. The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, was now faced
with plaintiffs' motion to vacate the default.
Noting that the case had obvious merit' 50 and that the motion to
restore was timely,'5 ' the court granted plaintiffs' motion to vacate the
CPLR 3404 dismissal. 5 2 The Fourth Department was careful to point
out that, since the statute of limitations had run, plaintiffs' claims
would be extinguished by a dismissal, and therefore "the blame for the
delay and expense involved in these proceedings should be fixed where
it rightfully belongs, upon the attorney for the plaintiffs."' 5 3 Accordingly, the motion to vacate the dismissal was granted on condition that
plaintiffs' attorney personally pay to defendants' attorneys $1000 in
costs. " ;4
Indeed, the neglect to prosecute dismissal is "drastic,"' 55 particularly in light of the fact that the attorney is very often the party
responsible for such neglect. 5 6 Where, as in Schickler, plaintiff would
otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations from bringing a new
action, his only remedy is a malpractice action. 57 This may prove to be
costly and time consuming for the client and disastrous for the attorney.
The imposition of substantial penalties upon "offending counsel
150Id. at 817, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 226. In Schickler, substantial injuries were involved
and defendant had pleaded guilty to failing to yield the right of way. N.Y. VEH. & TRau.
LAw § 1142(a) (McKinney 1970).
15145 App. Div. 2d at 817, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 226.
152 Id. at 816, 357 N.Y.S2d at 226.
153 Id. at 817, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 226.
'54 Id.
'55 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3216, commentary at 919 (1970), quoting Schwarz v. United
States, 384 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1967).
156 See, e.g., Quinn v. Cohen, 37 App. Div. 2d 927, 326 N.Y.S.2d 161 (Ist Dep't 1971)
(per curiam); note 161 infra.
157 The measure of damages in such an action would be what the plaintif-dient
would have recovered had he or she prevailed in the first action; this is determined by
the jury in the malpractice trial. Gladden v. Logan, 28 App. Div. 2d 1116, 284 N.Y.S.2d
920 (Ist Dep't 1967) (per curiam).
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personally" certainly seems, as one commentator has suggested, the
preferable approach. 158
Such approach has been favored by the Second Department. In
Moran v. Rynar 59 the court imposed a $250 penalty upon the neglectful
attorney as a condition for vacating the dismissal. 16 0 In subsequent cases
involving both 3404 and 3216 dismissals, the Second Department has
consistently imposed similar small penalties upon the recalcitrant attorney as a condition to restoring the case to calendar. 101
The Schickler court, while adopting the Second Department's
approach, has nevertheless made an important departure from the
16 2
rather lenient penalty of $250 generally imposed by that Department.
As one commentator wisely noted, the sum of $250 does not constitute
a sufficient deterrent to neglectful prosecution. 16 The Schickler penalty
of $1000 appears more realistic in that it is better designed to discourage attorney neglect and incompetence while the blameless litigant
is still allowed his day in court.' 6 '
ARnCLE

50 -

JUDGMENTS GENERALLY

CPLR 5015(a): On motion, trial court uses inherent discretionary
158 7B McKNNEY'S CPLR 3216, commentary at 919 (1970). In this commentary, Professor David D. Siegel, discussing a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-

cuit to penalize the attorney rather than dismiss a meritorious cause of action, see note
155 supra, states that "[t]he New York courts might profitably adopt that approach for
the benefit of the lawyer" who would otherwise face a malpractice suit and/or a disdplinary proceeding. Id. (emphasis in original).
159 39 App. Div. 2d 718, 332 N.Y.S.2d 138 (2d Dep't 1972) (mem.).
160 In vacating the dismissal, the court stated:
A proper exercise of discretion in cases like this requires a balanced consideration
of all relevant factors, including the merit or lack of merit in the action, seriousness of the injury, extent of the delay, excuse for the delay, prejudice or lack
of prejudice to the defendant, and intent or lack of intent to deliberately default
or abandon the action. Also to be weighed in the balance is our strong public
policy that actions be disposed of on the merits.
Id. at 718-19, 332 N.YS.2d at 14041 (citation omitted).
161 See Cohen v. Tucker, 44 App. Div. 2d 706, 354 N.YS.2d 691 (2d Dep't 1974)
(mem.) ($250 penalty); Urban v. Maloney, 40 App. Div. 2d 531, 334 N.Y.S.2d 122 (2d
Dep't 1972) (mem.) ($250 penalty); Moran v. Rynar, 39 App. Div. 2d 718, 332 N.YS.2d
138 (2d Dep't 1972) (mem.) ($250 penalty); Springer v. Morangio, 38 App. Div. 2d 852,
330 N.Y.S.2d 100 (2d Dep't 1972) (mem.) ($100 penalty).
162 See note 161 supra.
1637B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 3216, commentary at 97 (Supp. 1974). Professor Siegel
states:
The sum of $250, or anything near it, does not seem to constitute a deterrent
to neglectful prosecution ....
[T]he irresponsible minority among lawyers who
collect cases but do not prosecute them diligently will be favored even beyond
the great generosity CPLR 3216 already shows them.
Id.
164 Notwithstanding the apparent logic of the Schickler decision, the lower penalty
has been adhered to in recent First and Second Department cases. See, e.g., Cichorek v.
Cosgrove, 47 App. Div. 2d 883, 367 N.Y.S2d 7 (Ist Dep't 1975) ($350 penalty); Sommer v.
Fucci, 47 App. Div. 2d 771, 365 N.Y.S.2d 249 (2d Dep't 1975) ($100 penalty).

